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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue: Did the trial court err in declining to bind Defendant over on burglary?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The determination of whether to find a criminal defendant over for trial is a question of law"
reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v. Clark, 200 1UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 provides:
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in
a building or any portion of a building with the intent to commit:
(a) a felony;
(b) theft;...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count of burglary. R. 3. At preliminary hearing, the Court
declined to bind the Defendant over for trial. R. 20, 26-27.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts stated in the Appellant's brief, Appellee states the following additional
facts. See Utah R. App. P. 24(b)(1) (appellee may rely upon appellant's statement of facts).
At preliminary hearing on the charge burglary, the State's purported victim squarely
admitted that the defendant "had the right to be over at my property." R: 32:15.
She clarified, reiterated, and expanded: "I told the cops . . . it was okay for him to be over
there, and I don't want to press any charges" but that the police had later stated to her, "We have
enough evidence that we have to prosecute no matter what you say." R: 32:18 (emphasis added).
The Prosecutor cross-examined his own witness, pressed her on this point, but she held firm:
Q.

So your testimony is that you allowed him to go into your
house on that day?

A.

Yes. I don ythave any problem with him going in my house
because I know heys not goin2 to steal anything.

Q.

Did you tell the cops that you had authorized him to go into your
house?

A.

Yes, I did.

Q.

Okay. Did he make - did he ever call you prior to this incident
happening - prior to him going into your house? Did he call you
before that?

A.

Yeah, he called me and I -

Q.

Did he call you before the incident that day?
2

A.

I think so. I think so. I just don't remember.

Q.

Do you remember if he called you before the incident happened?

A.

I think he - I'm pretty sure he did.

Q.

Do you remember whait he said to you?

A.

He said basically, "Fm going to come over today," but I didn't know
what time, and then I took off in the car, and then when I came back
- when I was at Wal-Mart I stopped by his house and his hands were
cut up and the cops were over at the neighbors. So I was kind of in
the dark. I didn't know what was going on. I didn't even know what
had happened then.

Q.

Did you tell him when he called you before the incident that he could
not go into your house?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

Okay. I - do you know if anything was missing from your house?

A.

There wasn't anything.

Q.

You checked your house and there was nothing missing?

A.

Yeah. Everything was there. Everything was there.

R: 35:19-20 (emphasis added).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Court did not err in not binding over a defendant on burglary charges given that the
3

State's directly disavowed under oath that she was burgled - that she had given the Defendant
permission to enter the home.

ARGUMENTS
Bind-over is appropriate if the Court determines that there is "sufficient evidence to support
a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d 300.
While admittedly the Clark standard defines narrowly the court's role in evaluating evidence
at the preliminary hearing stage, Clark explicitly reaffirms the court's critical responsibility to
"ferret [ ] out... groundless and improvident prosecutions.f' Id. atfflf16 (second alteration in original)
(quotations and citations omitted).
It is important to note that Clark did not involve a preliminary hearing in which the State's
alleged victim directly disavows the prosecution's case and required elements of the charged crime,
and thus affirming the non-bind-over in this case would not be contrary to Clark, but would rather
be appropriately based on a distinction of the unique facts of the present case. Certainly, a burglary
case in which the State' s alleged victim directly and, even upon cross-examination by the prosecutor,
disavows any notion that the Defendant did not have permission to be in the home in question and
states that she communicated her permission to him prior to the events in question, is an example
of a case in which a court certainly must be given the leeway to decline to bind over.
The logical extension of a ruling that bind over was mandatory in this case would signal a
complete abandonment of the court's duty to ferret out cases which should not be allowed to
proceed, as demonstrated in the following scenarios:
4

—

If the alleged victim in a rape case affirmatively testifies that the sex between her and
the defendant was consensual, must the court still bind over based on other
peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the contrary?

—

If the alleged victim in a theft case affirmatively testifies that she gave the item
alleged to have been stolen to the defendant, must the court still bind over based on
other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the
contrary?

—

If the alleged adult victim in a kidnaping case affirmatively testifies that she went
with the defendant by choice and willingly, must the court still bind over based on
other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the
contrary?

Just as the answer to the above scenarios is that a prudent judge should not bind over in such
cases, so did the judge in this case act prudently in declining to bind over a burglary charge where
the alleged victim affirmatively testifies that she gave the Defendant permission to be in the home,
despite some other peripheral evidence potentially yielding some possible inference to the contrary.
The State does not cite a single case in which a Court has overturned a decision not to bindover a burglary defendant when the alleged victim indicated at preliminary hearing that she gave the
defendant permission to enter the home; indeed, the State does not even cite a case addressing this
specific issue. The absence of such case law suggests the rarity and improvidence of a prosecutor
prosecuting a burglary case when the victim's position is that the defendant had permission to enter
the premises (in other words, it is appellee's counsel's suggestion that such cases do not show up in
the appellate case law because such cases are usually not - if ever - prosecuted). Indeed, reversing
5

the non-bind-over in this case would, on a pragmatic level, be pointless: where is a prosecutor going
to go in a burglary case where the alleged victim directly and solidly denies under oath that she was
burgled?
It is instructive to note that unlawful entry alone is not sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony or a theft. See State v. Pitts,
728 P.2d 113,117 (Utah 1986). Courts have found such intent based upon, e.g., the possession of
stolen property following the entry. See id. No such fact exists in this case - nothing was stolen;
the alleged victim confirmed and reconfirmed this upon harsh cross-examination by the prosecutor.
And, more importantly, the alleged victim testified she gave the Defendant permission to enter the
premises, albeit not by breaking the window; but, again, unlawful entry alone is not sufficient to
support a reasonable inference that the defendant entered with the intent to commit a felony or theft.
See id. The State relies upon State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah 1985) to argue that burglary can
be established even without a showing that the defendant had taken anything, but again this misses
the point; in the case at bar, the Defendant had permission to enter the premises, unlike the
defendants in Porter or Pitts.
CONCLUSION
The alleged victim's direct disavowal of the burglary charge through her sworn testimony
that she gave permission to defendant to enter the premises justifies the court's decision to not bind
the defendant over on the burglary charge in this case.
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Clark imposes a strict standard, but does not mandate bind-over in these unique facts.
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